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I/

INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether imposing conditions on the tariff preferences accorded to

developing countries under the world trading system’s generalized system of preferences (the
“GSP”) is a legitimate tactic of developed members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
More specifically, it examines the WTO-legality of the conditions the European Communities
(EC) and the United States (US) impose on the tariff preferences they accord to developing
countries under their individual GSP schemes (the “EC GSP Scheme” and the “US GSP
Scheme”, respectively).
Part II reviews the events which led to the establishment of the GSP that permits
developed WTO members to accord tariff preferences to developing countries without according
the same to other WTO members. Part III: (i) generally discusses the establishment of individual
GSP schemes and the emergence of conditional tariff preferences and (ii) specifically discusses
the establishment of the GSP schemes of the EC and the US and the emergence of conditional
tariff preferences in those schemes. Part IV summarizes the WTO Appellate Body’s decision in
EC – Tariff Preferences and illustrates the implications that decision has for conditional tariff
preferences.1 Part V outlines the changes that were made to the EC GSP Scheme in response to
the Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Tariff Preferences. Part VI assesses the WTO-legality of
those conditions in the GSP schemes of the EC and the US which are based on developing
countries’ compliance with certain labour standards (the “labour standards conditions”). Finally,
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Part VII concludes that, while the conditions in the current EC GSP Scheme might withstand a
WTO challenge, the conditions in the current US GSP Scheme would not.
II/

THE CREATION OF THE GSP
The history presented in this Part takes the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade (GATT) as its starting point.2 In 1947, the contracting parties to the GATT agreed,
inter alia, that:
[w]ith respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation … any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties.3
This agreement, which is contained in Article I:1 and commonly referred to as the most-favoured
nation (MFN) treatment clause, obliges contracting parties to the GATT to extend any benefit
they grant to the products of another contracting party to the like products of all contracting
parties (the “MFN obligation”). In simple terms, it prohibits contracting parties to the GATT
from discriminating between the like products of other contracting parties.4 It is well-recognized
that the MFN obligation in Article I:1 has been a cornerstone of the world trading system since
the GATT came into force in 1948.5
In the early 1960s, developing countries began to express their discontent with the world
trading system established by the GATT.6 Among other things, they took issue with the MFN
obligation in Article I:1 and argued that, in order to advance their economic prospects, they
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needed their exports to receive generalized preferential treatment.7 The collective efforts of a
group of 77 developing countries (i.e. the Group of 77) led to the establishment of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) – an organization which seeks to
promote “the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world
economy”.8 At the second UNCTAD conference, which took place in New Delhi in 1968, it was
agreed that a “system of generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences” would
be instituted for the benefit of developing countries.9 It was further agreed that the objectives of
the GSP would be to increase developing countries’ export earnings, promote their
industrialization, and accelerate their rates of economic growth.10 A Special Committee on
Preferences was established by the UNCTAD to settle the details of the GSP arrangements.11
Once the details of the GSP arrangements were settled, a limited waiver of the provisions
of Article I:1 had to be obtained from the contracting parties to the GATT.12 This was necessary
because the contemplated GSP was inconsistent with the MFN obligation in Article I:1 (i.e. it
permitted developed contracting parties to the GATT to discriminate between the like products of
developed and developing contracting parties).13 The requisite waiver was obtained in 1971. The
contracting parties to the GATT agreed that, for a period of 10 years, the provisions of Article I:1
would be waived “to the extent necessary to permit developed contracting parties … to accord
preferential tariff treatment to products originating in developing countries … without according
7
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such treatment to like products of other contracting parties” (the “1971 Waiver”).14 The 1971
Waiver was subject to the proviso that any preferential tariff treatment provided under it would
have to “be designed to facilitate trade from developing countries … and not to raise barriers to
the trade of other contracting parties”.15
Shortly before the expiry of the 1971 Waiver, the contracting parties to the GATT agreed
that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article I:1, they would be permitted to “accord
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such
treatment to other contracting parties”.16 This agreement, which is commonly referred to as the
Enabling Clause, permanently authorizes the GSP described in the 1971 Waiver.17 It also, inter
alia, authorizes developed contracting parties to the GATT to accord special preferential tariff
treatment to the products of the least developed of the developing countries.18 The Enabling
Clause includes the proviso that any preferential tariff treatment provided under it must: (i) “be
designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or
create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties”; (ii) “not constitute an
impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs … on a most-favoured nation basis”; and,
(iii) “be designed … to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of
developing countries”.19

14

Generalized System of Preferences, 25 June 1971, GATT C.P. Dec. L/3545 at para. (a), reprinted in Annex D-2 to
European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (Complaint by
India) (2003), WTO Doc. WT/DS246/R (Panel Report) [1971 Waiver].
15
Ibid.
16
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, 28
November 1979, GATT C.P. Dec. L/4903 at para. 1, reprinted in Annex D-1 to European Communities – Conditions
for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (Complaint by India) (2003), WTO Doc.
WT/DS246/R (Panel Report) [Enabling Clause].
17
Ibid. at para. 2(a) and footnote 3; Bartels, supra note 12 at 464.
18
Enabling Clause, supra note 16 at para. 2(d).
19
Ibid. at para. 3.

4

It is worth noting at this point that both Article I:1 of the GATT and the Enabling Clause
were incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), which
forms part of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the "WTO
Agreement ").20 Accordingly, while WTO members are generally prohibited from discriminating
between the like products of other WTO members, developed WTO members are permitted to
accord preferential tariff treatment to the products of developing countries (and special
preferential tariff treatment to the products of the least developed of the developing countries)
without according such treatment to the like products of other WTO members.
III/

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL GSP SCHEMES & THE
EMERGENCE OF CONDITIONAL TARIFF PREFERENCES
(A)

General Comments

Because a number of developed countries, including the EC and the US, were opposed to
the establishment of a multilaterally-coordinated GSP scheme, the GSP described in the 1971
Waiver (and expanded by the Enabling Clause) was implemented by developed contracting
parties to the GATT on an individual basis.21 Without exception, the developed countries that
established GSP schemes imposed conditions on the tariff preferences they accorded to
developing countries.22 Initially, the conditions imposed were based solely on the
competitiveness of the products of developing countries.23 It was thus typical for a GSP scheme
to: (i) limit the types of products that were eligible for tariff preferences; (ii) permit tariff
preferences relating to a given product sector to be withdrawn once a beneficiary country
reached a certain level of competitiveness in that sector; (iii) allow for the exclusion of a
20
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beneficiary country once it reached a certain level of development; and, (iv) permit tariff
preferences that caused, or threatened to cause, injury to a domestic industry to be withdrawn
from a beneficiary country (collectively “competitiveness conditions”).24 As time went on,
however, some developed countries, including the EC and the US, began to tie the tariff
preferences they accorded to developing countries under their GSP schemes to other types of
conditions, including labour standards conditions.25
(B)

The EC GSP Scheme

The EC was the first contracting party to the GATT to implement the GSP described in
the 1971 Waiver.26 It established the EC GSP Scheme in 1971.27 The EC has always imposed
competitiveness conditions on the tariff preferences it has accorded to developing countries.28 It
was not until the 1990s, however, that the EC began to tie those tariff preferences to other types
of conditions.29 In 1994, a provision which allows the EC to withdraw tariff preferences on
labour standards grounds was added to the EC GSP Scheme.30 And, in 1998, the EC began to
accord additional tariff preferences to developing countries which enforced certain labour,
environmental and anti-drug trafficking standards.31
When EC – Tariff Preferences came before the WTO Appellate Body in 2004, the EC
GSP Scheme consisted of 5 arrangements: (i) the general arrangements, under which all
developing countries were eligible to receive the same tariff preferences (the “General
Arrangements”); (ii) the special incentive arrangements for the protection of labour rights, under
24
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which those developing countries that effectively applied national legislation incorporating the
standards laid down in 8 International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions were eligible for
additional tariff preferences (the “Labour Arrangements”); (iii) the special incentive
arrangements for the protection of the environment, under which those developing countries that
effectively applied national legislation incorporating internationally-recognized standards
relating to the sustainable management of tropical forests were eligible for additional tariff
preferences (the “Environmental Arrangements); (iv) the special arrangements for leastdeveloped countries (LDCs), under which those developing countries identified as LDCs by the
United Nations were eligible for additional tariff preferences (the “LDC Arrangements”); and,
(v) the special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking, under which 12
developing countries deemed by the EC to be making efforts to fight the cultivation and
trafficking of illegal drugs were eligible to receive additional tariff preferences (the “Drug
Arrangements”).32 The tariff preferences accorded to developing countries under all 5
arrangements were subject to competitiveness conditions.33
When EC – Tariff Preferences was heard, the EC GSP Scheme also contained a provision
which allowed the Commission of the EC (the “Commission”) to temporarily withdraw a
developing country’s tariff preferences if that country, inter alia: (i) practiced any form of
slavery or forced labour; (ii) used child labour; (iii) was responsible for any serious and
systematic violations of the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining or the
principle of non-discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; (iv) exported goods
32
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made by prison labour; (v) had shortcomings in its customs controls on the export or transit of
illegal drugs; or, (vi) failed to comply with international conventions on money-laundering
(collectively the “Withdrawal Criteria”).34
(C)

The US GSP Scheme

The US GSP Scheme was instituted in 1976.35 Like the EC, the US has always imposed
competitiveness conditions on the tariff preferences it has accorded to developing countries.36
Unlike the EC, however, the US did not let any time pass before it began to tie those tariff
preferences to other types of conditions.37 The US excluded communist countries and members
of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) from its GSP scheme from the
start.38 Less than a decade later, it began tying developing countries’ eligibility for tariff
preferences to their intellectual property and worker rights protections.39 Since that time, the US
has packed its GSP scheme with a wide range of conditions.40
Subject to some limited exceptions, the current US GSP Scheme provides that a
developing country is ineligible for tariff preferences if it: (i) is a communist country; (ii) is part
of an international cartel (such as OPEC); (iii) accords preferential treatment to the products of a
developed country that has, or is likely to have, a significant adverse effect on US commerce;
(iv) has nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized property owned by a US citizen,
corporation, partnership or association; (v) fails to recognize or enforce arbitral awards in favor
of US citizens, corporations, partnerships or associations; (vi) grants sanctuary from prosecution
34
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to any individual or group that has committed an act of international terrorism; (vii) has not
taken, or is not taking, steps to support the US’ efforts to combat terrorism; (viii) has not taken,
or is not taking, steps to accord internationally-recognized worker rights to its workers; or, (viii)
has not implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labour (collectively
the “Mandatory Ineligibility Criteria”).41
The current US GSP Scheme also provides that, in considering whether a developing
country is eligible for tariff preferences, the President of the US (the “President”) must consider,
inter alia, the extent to which the country: (i) has assured the US that it will provide equitable
and reasonable access to its markets and basic commodity resources and refrain from engaging in
unreasonable export practices; (ii) is providing adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights; and, (iii) has taken, or is taking steps to accord internationally-recognized worker
rights to its workers (collectively the “Discretionary Ineligibility Criteria”).42
Once it is determined that a developing country is eligible for tariff preferences under the
US GSP Scheme, the tariff preferences accorded to that country are subject to competitiveness
conditions.43 In addition, the US GSP Scheme provides that a developing country may lose its
beneficiary status, or some or all of its tariff preferences, in certain circumstances. It provides,
for example, that a developing country’s beneficiary status will be suspended or withdrawn if,
due to a change in circumstances, that country ends up falling within one of the Mandatory
Ineligibility Criteria.44 The US GSP Scheme also provides that, upon considering the
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Discretionary Ineligibility Criteria, the President may exercise his discretion to withdraw,
suspend or limit a developing country’s tariff preferences at any time.45
The WTO-legality of the conditions the EC and the US impose on the tariff preferences
they accord to developing countries under their GSP schemes was called into question in EC –
Tariff Preferences.
IV/

THE APPELLATE BODY’S DECISION IN EC – TARIFF PREFERENCES
(A)

Facts

In March 2002, India requested WTO consultations with the EC regarding the conditions
the EC was imposing on the additional tariff preferences it accorded to developing countries
under its GSP scheme.46 India, which was only eligible for tariff preferences under the General
Arrangements, claimed that the additional tariff preferences the EC was according to other
developing countries were: (i) creating undue difficulties for its exports to the EC and (ii)
nullifying, or at least impairing, the benefits accruing to it under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
and the Enabling Clause.47 India argued that the conditions the EC was imposing on the
additional tariff preferences it made available to developing countries under the Drug, Labour
and Environmental Arrangements were not WTO-legal as they could not be reconciled with the
requirements of the Enabling Clause.48 Not surprisingly, the EC disagreed.
When consultations failed to settle the dispute between India and the EC, India requested
the establishment of a WTO panel. In its December 2002 request, India challenged the Drug,
Labour and Environmental Arrangements.49 Before a panel was established, however, India
45
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decided to limit its complaint to the Drug Arrangements and to reserve its right to bring
additional complaints regarding the Labour and Environmental Arrangements.50 Accordingly,
only the Drug Arrangements were in issue in EC – Tariff Preferences.51
A panel was established to hear India’s complaint (the “Panel”) in March 2003.52 It met
with the parties in May and July 2003.53 In its submissions to the Panel, India argued that the
Drug Arrangements were inconsistent with Article I:1 and not justified by the Enabling Clause.54
The Panel issued its report in December 2003.55 It concluded, inter alia, that: (i) India had
demonstrated that the Drug Arrangements were inconsistent with Article I:1 and (ii) the EC had
failed to demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements were justified by the Enabling Clause.56 The
EC appealed the Panel’s decision to the WTO Appellate Body.
(B)

Appellate Body’s Decision

The EC’s appeal was heard in February 2004.57 In its report of April 2004, the Appellate
Body concluded, inter alia, that: (i) it was unnecessary for it to rule on the Panel’s conclusion
that the Drug Arrangements were inconsistent with Article I:1 and (ii) the Panel was correct in
concluding that the Drug Arrangements were not justified by the Enabling Clause.58
(i)

Relationship Between Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause

The Appellate Body began its analysis of whether the Drug Arrangements were
inconsistent with Article I:1 by examining the relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling
Clause. It determined that developed WTO members are excepted from complying with the
50
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MFN obligation in Article I:1 when they accord preferential tariff treatment to developing
countries that is consistent with the requirements of the Enabling Clause.59 The Appellate Body
thus upheld the Panel’s finding that the Enabling Clause operates as an exception to Article I:1.60
The Appellate Body went on to uphold the Panel’s finding that the Enabling Clause does not
exclude the applicability of Article I:1.61 In other words, it agreed with the Panel that, when a
measure which provides preferential tariff treatment to developing countries is challenged under
Article I:1, the panel considering the challenge must: (i) examine whether the measure is
consistent with Article I:1 and, if it considers the measure to be inconsistent with Article I:1, (ii)
examine whether the measure is nevertheless justified by the Enabling Clause.62
The Appellate Body did modify one of the Panel’s findings with respect to the
relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause. Although it upheld the Panel’s finding
that the onus was on the EC to prove that the Drug Arrangements were consistent with the
Enabling Clause, the Appellate Body did not uphold the Panel’s finding that it was up to the EC
to raise the relevant provisions of the Enabling Clause.63 Instead, the Appellate Body found that,
in alleging that the Drug Arrangements were inconsistent with Article I:1, it was incumbent upon
India to raise those provisions of the Enabling Clause that it alleged the Drug Arrangements were
inconsistent with.64 Fortunately for India, the Appellate Body found that it had sufficiently raised
the relevant provisions of the Enabling Clause before the Panel.65
The EC’s appeal of the Panel’s conclusion that the Drug Arrangements were inconsistent
with Article I:1 was based upon its claim that the Panel erred in finding that: (i) the Enabling
59
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Clause is an exception to Article I:1; (ii) the Enabling Clause does not exclude the applicability
of Article I:1; and, (iii) the onus was on the EC to prove that the Drug Arrangements were
consistent with the Enabling Clause.66 As the Appellate Body did not reverse any of these
findings, it held that it did not need to rule on the Panel’s conclusion respecting Article I:1.67
(ii)

The Requirements of the Enabling Clause

The Appellate Body went on to consider what the provisions of the Enabling Clause
require. It began its analysis by examining paragraph 2(a) of that Clause.68 The Appellate Body
determined that, in order to be justified by paragraph 2(a), tariff preferences provided under a
GSP scheme must be “generalized”, “non-reciprocal” and “non-discriminatory”.69 As the only
issue before it was whether the Drug Arrangements were “non-discriminatory”, the Appellate
Body only had to determine what that term requires.70
The Appellate Body began its analysis of what the term “non-discriminatory” requires by
examining the term’s ordinary meaning. It concludedthat, while the ordinary meaning of the
term “non-discriminatory” does not suggest that developed WTO members with GSP schemes
must accord identical tariff preferences to all developing countries, it does suggest that they must
accord identical tariff preferences to all similarly-situated developing countries.71
The Appellate Body went on to conduct a contextual analysis of what the term “nondiscriminatory” requires. It began this analysis by examining paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling
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Clause.72 The Appellate Body observed that, in order to be authorized by paragraph 3(c), tariff
preferences provided under a GSP scheme must respond to a “development, financial or trade
need” of developing countries.73 It then held that the existence of a development, financial or
trade need must be assessed according to an objective standard, like the wide-recognition of such
a need in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments.74 The Appellate Body also observed
that, in order to be authorized by paragraph 3(c), tariff preferences provided under a GSP scheme
must be a “positive” response to a development, financial or trade need of developing
countries.75 It then held that a sufficient nexus must exist between such tariff preferences and
their likelihood of alleviating the development, financial or trade need they are designed to
respond to.76
In light of its examination of the requirements of paragraph 3(c), the Appellate Body
suggested that a GSP scheme might be “non-discriminatory” notwithstanding the fact that it does
not accord identical tariff preferences to all developing countries.77 It further suggested that
additional tariff preferences provided under a GSP scheme might be “non-discriminatory” if
they: (i) seek to address a particular development, financial or trade need and (ii) are made
available to all developing countries that share that need.78
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The Appellate Body proceeded with its contextual analysis of what the term “nondiscriminatory” requires by examining paragraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause.79 It concluded
that, although a GSP scheme that accords different tariff preferences to different developing
countries (according to their varying needs) might meet the requirements of the term “nondiscriminatory”, paragraph 3(a) dictates that it will not meet the requirements of the Enabling
Clause if it imposes “unjustifiable burdens” on other WTO members.80
Ultimately, the Appellate Body concluded that the term “non-discriminatory” does not
prohibit developed WTO members with GSP schemes from according different tariff preferences
to different developing countries, as long as such differential tariff treatment complies with the
Enabling Clause’s other requirements. The Appellate Body noted, however, that the term “nondiscriminatory” does require developed WTO members with GSP schemes to accord identical
tariff preferences to all similarly-situated developing countries (i.e. all developing countries that
share the development, financial or trade need the tariff preferences are intended to respond to).81
In light of its conclusions, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding that the term “nondiscriminatory” requires developed WTO members with GSP schemes to provide identical tariff
preferences to all developing countries.82
(iii)

The Drug Arrangements’ Consistency with the Requirements of the
Enabling Clause

The Appellate Body went on to consider whether the Drug Arrangements met the
Enabling Clause’s non-discrimination requirement. It noted that the “need” the Drug
Arrangements purported to address was the problem of illicit drug production and trafficking in
79
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certain developing countries (the “Drug Problem”).83 It then held that, in order to meet the
Enabling Clause’s non-discrimination requirement, the Drug Arrangements would, inter alia,
have to be available to all developing countries similarly affected by the Drug Problem.84 The
Appellate Body concluded that the Drug Arrangements failed to meet this criterion because: (i)
only the 12 developing countries deemed by the EC to be making efforts to fight the Drug
Problem were beneficiaries of the Drug Arrangements; (ii) there was no mechanism (short of an
amendment) under which additional developing countries similarly affected by the Drug
Problem could be added to the Drug Arrangements’ list of beneficiaries; (iii) the EC’s decision
to distinguish between the beneficiaries of the Drug Arrangements and other developing
countries was not based upon any clear prerequisites or objective criteria; and, (iv) there was no
criteria according to which a developing country could lose its status as a beneficiary of the Drug
Arrangements when it ceased to be similarly affected by the Drug Problem.85 Accordingly, the
Appellate Body upheld (albeit for different reasons) the Panel’s conclusion that the Drug
Arrangements were not justified by the Enabling Clause.86
In April 2004, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body adopted both the Appellate Body’s
report and the Panel’s report, as modified by the Appellate Body’s report.87 The EC was thus
requested to bring the Drug Arrangements into conformity with its obligations under the GATT
1994 (i.e. into conformity with the rulings in the Appellate Body’s report and the modified report
of the Panel).88
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(C)

Implications of the Appellate Body’s Decision

The Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Tariff Preferences has “clear implications” for
the conditions the EC and the US impose on the tariff preferences they accord to developing
countries under their GSP schemes.89 Although it contemplates that conditions can be imposed
on tariff preferences provided under GSP schemes, the Appellate Body’s decision dictates that
such conditions must, inter alia: (i) seek to address an objective development, financial or trade
need of developing countries and (ii) be made available to all similarly-situated developing
countries.90 It is well-recognized that only a couple of the conditions described in Sections (B)
and (C) of Part III would “have a good chance” of meeting these requirements and being
declared WTO-legal.91
V/

THE EC’S RESPONSE TO THE APPELLATE BODY’S DECISION IN EC –
TARIFF PREFERENCES
It did not take long for the EC to recognize that the WTO-legality of a number of the

conditions it imposed on the tariff preferences it made available to developing countries under its
GSP scheme had been called into question by the Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Tariff
Preferences. Accordingly, in 2005, the EC made significant changes to its GSP scheme in an
attempt to bring its conditions into conformity with the Appellate Body’s rulings.92 Although the
General Arrangements and the LDC Arrangements remain intact under the new EC GSP
Scheme, the Labour, Environmental and Drug Arrangements have been merged into a single
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arrangement.93 The new arrangement, which is commonly referred to as the GSP-Plus, purports
to be a “special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance”.94
In order to be eligible for additional tariff preferences under the GSP-Plus, a developing
country must: (i) have ratified and effectively implemented 16 core human and labour rights
conventions (the “Core Conventions”) and 11 conventions related to the environment and
governance principles (collectively the “Relevant Conventions”); (ii) give an undertaking to
maintain the ratification of the Relevant Conventions and their implementing national legislation
and measures; (iii) accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in
accordance with the implementation provisions of the Relevant Conventions; and, (iv) be a
vulnerable country.95 For the purposes of the GSP-Plus, a developing country is “vulnerable” if:
(i) it is not classified by the World Bank as a high income country; (ii) its 5 largest GSP-covered
exports to the EC represent more than 75 percent of its total GSP-covered exports; and, (iii) its
GSP-covered exports to the EC represent less than 1 percent of all GSP-covered exports to the
EC.96 In other words, additional tariff preferences under the GSP-Plus are only accorded to
developing countries that can demonstrate “that their economies are ‘dependent and
vulnerable’”.97 Like the tariff preferences that are accorded to developing countries under the
General Arrangements and the LDC Arrangements, the tariff preferences the EC makes available
to developing countries under the GSP-Plus are subject to competitiveness conditions.98
When determining a developing country’s eligibility for additional tariff preferences
under the GSP-Plus, the Commission is required to consider the findings of the international
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organizations and agencies that monitor the implementation of the Relevant Conventions.99 Once
a developing country acquires beneficiary status under the GSP-Plus, it stands to lose some or all
its additional tariff preferences if: (i) its national legislation no longer incorporates the Relevant
Conventions or (ii) it fails to effectively implement its national legislation incorporating the
Relevant Conventions.100 At present, the EC is according additional tariff preferences to 15
developing countries under the GSP-Plus.101
In addition to the General Arrangements, the LDC Arrangements and the GSP-Plus, the
new EC GSP Scheme contains a modified version of the Withdrawal Criteria. The modified
Withdrawal Criteria provide that a developing country may have some or all of its tariff
preferences withdrawn if, inter alia, it is responsible for any serious and systematic violations of
the principles laid down in the Core Conventions.102 The EC has suggested that this condition is
necessary in order to promote the objectives of the Core Conventions and “to ensure that no
beneficiary receives unfair advantage through continuous violation of those conventions”.103 The
new EC GSP Scheme mandates that, when determining whether a developing country is
responsible for any serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in the Core
Conventions, the Commission must rely on the conclusions of the relevant international
monitoring bodies.104
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Unlike the EC, the US did not reform its GSP scheme in response to the Appellate
Body’s decision in EC – Tariff Preferences. Accordingly, the US GSP Scheme remains as
described in Section (C) of Part III.
VI/

WTO-LEGALITY OF THE LABOUR STANDARDS CONDITIONS IN THE GSP
SCHEMES OF THE EC AND THE US
Although the WTO-legality of many of the conditions the EC and the US impose on the

tariff preferences they accord to developing countries under their GSP schemes has been called
into question by the Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Tariff Preferences, this Part only
examines the WTO-legality of the labour standards conditions in the current GSP schemes of the
EC and the US.
(A)

WTO-Legality of the Labour Standards Conditions in the EC GSP Scheme

This Section examines the WTO-legality of the labour standards conditions in the current EC
GSP Scheme.
(i)

WTO-Legality of the Labour Rights Component of the GSP-Plus

The GSP-Plus is based upon the premise that developing countries that implement certain
international standards in: (i) human and labour rights, (ii) environmental protection, (iii) the
fight against illegal drugs and (iv) the fight against corruption will be better equipped to achieve
sustainable development.105 This “integral concept of sustainable development” is recognized in
a number of international conventions and instruments.106 The specific problem the GSP-Plus
purports to address is the “vulnerability” that some developing countries (i.e. those with
dependent and vulnerable economies) experience while assuming the “special burdens and
responsibilities” that come with their ratification and effective implementation of the Relevant
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Conventions.107 It thus appears that the specific problem the labour rights component of the
GSP-Plus is designed to address is the vulnerability that some developing countries experience
while assuming the special burdens and responsibilities that come with their ratification and
effective implementation of the core labour rights conventions that form part of the Relevant
Conventions (the “Core Labour Rights Conventions”). In other words, it appears that the
additional tariff preferences the EC accords to some developing countries pursuant to the labour
rights component of the GSP-Plus are intended to alleviate the struggles those developing
countries face in honouring their commitments under the Core Labour Rights Conventions (the
“Labour Standards Commitments Problem”).108
The Core Labour Rights Conventions are all ILO conventions.109 In fact, they are the
same ILO conventions that set out the standards developing countries were required to
incorporate into their national legislation (and effectively apply) in order to be eligible for
additional tariff preferences under the Labour Arrangements.110 They are also the ILO
conventions that were used to develop the core labour standards that are set out in the ILO
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (the “ILO Declaration”).111 The ILO
Declaration obliges all ILO members to respect, promote, and realize the following fundamental
principles and rights: (i) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining; (ii) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (iii) the
effective abolition of child labour; and, (iv) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
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employment and occupation (collectively the “ILO Core Labour Standards”).112 It is
acknowledged in the ILO Declaration that some ILO members (i.e. developing ILO members
with dependent and vulnerable economies) will have difficulties: (i) implementing the ILO Core
Labour Standards and (ii) ratifying and implementing the Core Labour Rights Conventions.113 It
thus appears that the Labour Standards Commitments Problem is an objective development,
financial or trade need of some developing countries.
There is little doubt that the additional tariff preferences that are accorded to developing
countries under the GSP-Plus will generate extra financial resources for those countries.114 Extra
financial resources are bound to help alleviate the struggles those countries face in honouring
their commitments under the Core Labour Rights Conventions.115 It thus appears that the labour
rights component of the GSP-Plus is a positive response to the Labour Standards Commitments
Problem.
It also appears that the labour rights component of the GSP-Plus makes the same
additional tariff preferences available to all similarly-situated developing countries (i.e. all
developing countries with dependent and vulnerable economies that ratify and effectively
implement the Core Labour Rights Conventions). The new EC GSP Scheme greatly limits the
discretion the Commission can exercise when assessing a developing country’s eligibility for
additional tariff preferences under the GSP-Plus.116 The fact that a developing country must have
ratified and effectively implemented the Core Labour Rights Conventions provides a very
specific (and objective) basis for the Commission’s assessment of a developing country’s
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eligibility for additional tariff preferences under the labour rights component of the GSP-Plus.117
It is also notable that, when conducting such an eligibility assessment, the Commission is
required to consider the findings of the ILO Committee of Experts (i.e. the international body
that monitors the implementation of the Core Labour Rights Conventions).118 This suggests that
a developing country’s eligibility for additional tariff preferences under the labour rights
component of the GSP-Plus is assessed on the basis of objective findings.119 There are also
objective criteria pursuant to which a developing country can lose its status as a beneficiary of
the labour rights component of the GSP-Plus when it ceases to be similarly affected by the
Labour Standards Commitments Problem. As mentioned in Part V, the new EC GSP Scheme
provides that a developing country may lose its beneficiary status if: (i) its national legislation no
longer incorporates the Core Labour Rights Conventions or (ii) it no longer effectively
implements its national legislation incorporating those conventions.120
Finally, it does not appear that the labour rights component of the GSP-Plus imposes
unjustifiable burdens on any WTO members. The ILO has taken the position that all its
members, whatever their economic situation, are obliged to comply with the ILO Core Labour
Standards.121 It would thus be difficult for anyWTO member to claim that having to ratify and
effectively implement the Core Labour Rights Conventions would impose unjustifiable burdens
upon it.
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Based on the above analysis, it appears that the labour rights component of the GSP-Plus
meets all of the requirements the Appellate Body laid down in EC-Tariff Preferences.
Accordingly, it would likely be declared legal by a WTO adjudicating body.
(ii)

WTO-Legality of the Labour Rights Component of the Withdrawal
Criteria

In reaching its decision in EC – Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body did “not rule on
whether the Enabling Clause permits ab initio exclusions” of developing countries from GSP
schemes “or the partial or total withdrawal of [tariff preferences] … from certain developing
countries under certain conditions”.122 In other words, it did not speak to the WTO-legality of
GSP schemes which: (i) accord identical tariff preferences to all developing countries but
provide that those countries must meet certain minimum conditions in order to be eligible for
tariff preferences and/or (ii) provide for the withdrawal of tariff preferences from all developing
countries that fail to meet certain minimum conditions.123 Nevertheless, there has been much
commentary on the ramifications the Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Tariff Preferences has
for GSP schemes that employ these types of negative conditionality.124 It has been suggested that
the Appellate Body’s decision implies that the minimum conditions imposed by such GSP
schemes will only be justified by the Enabling Clause if they: (i) can be linked to generallyrecognized concepts of development and (ii) are non-discriminatory (i.e. based on objective
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criteria).125 In the ensuing text, these hypothetical requirements will be referred to as the
Predicted WTO Requirements.
The labour rights component of the new EC GSP Scheme’s Withdrawal Criteria provides
for the partial or total withdrawal of tariff preferences from developing countries that are
responsible for serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in the Core Labour
Rights Conventions.126 Developing countries are thus required to refrain from seriously and
systematically violating the ILO Core Labour Standards in order to avoid losing the tariff
preferences that have been accorded to them under the new EC GSP Scheme (the “Labour Rights
Minimum Condition”). This minimum condition appears to meet the Predicted WTO
Requirements. The fact that integral concepts of sustainable development acknowledge the need
for countries to comply with the ILO Core Labour Standards suggests that the Labour Rights
Minimum Condition is linked to well-recognized concepts of development.127 Moreover, it
appears that the Labour Rights Minimum Condition is non-discriminatory. The ILO Core Labour
Standards upon which the Labour Rights Minimum Condition is based are objective criteria. In
addition, in determining whether a developing country has breached the Labour Rights Minimum
Condition, the Commission is required to rely on the conclusions of the ILO Committee of
Experts.128 In other words, it is required to rely on objective findings.
Based on the above analysis, and assuming that a WTO adjudicating body would
determine its legality using the Predicted WTO Requirements, it appears that Labour Rights
Minimum Condition would be declared WTO-legal.
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(B)

WTO-Legality of the Labour Standards Conditions in the US GSP Scheme

This Section illustrates that the WTO-legality of the labour standards conditions in the
US GSP Scheme is much more questionable than that of the labour standards conditions in the
new EC GSP Scheme.
(i)

WTO-Legality of the Worker Rights Component of the Mandatory
Ineligibility Criteria

Unlike the EC GSP Scheme, which relies heavily on positive conditionality (i.e. trade
incentives), the US GSP Scheme relies exclusively on negative conditionality (i.e. trade
restrictions).129 The US GSP Scheme: (i) excludes ab initio developing countries that fail to meet
certain minimum conditions and (ii) accords identical tariff preferences (subject to
competitiveness conditions) to all those developing countries that acquire beneficiary status
under it. Accordingly, the Predicted WTO Requirements, rather than the Appellate Body’s
decision in EC – Tariff Preferences, must be used to assess the WTO-legality of the minimum
conditions the US imposes on the tariff preferences it accords to developing countries (i.e. the
Mandatory Ineligibility Criteria).
The worker rights component of the Mandatory Ineligibility Criteria provides that a
developing country will not be eligible for tariff preferences under the US GSP Scheme if it has
not taken, or is not taking, steps to accord internationally-recognized worker rights to its
workers.130 In other words, in order to be eligible for tariff preferences under the US GSP
Scheme, a developing country must be able to demonstrate that it has taken, or is taking, steps to
accord internationally-recognized worker rights to its workers (the “Worker Rights Minimum
Condition”). For the purposes of the Mandatory Ineligibility Criteria, the term “internationallyrecognized worker rights” includes: (i) the right of association; (ii) the right to organize and
129
130

Durán & Morgera, supra note 92 at 175 (footnote 17); Mason, supra note 124 at 524.
19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(G).

26

bargain collectively; (iii) a prohibition of forced or compulsory labour; (iv) a minimum age for
the employment of children; (v) a prohibition of the worst forms of child labour; and (vi)
acceptable conditions of work (with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational
safety and health).131
Unlike the Labour Rights Minimum Condition in the EC GSP Scheme, the Worker
Rights Minimum Condition in the US GSP Scheme is not based solely on the ILO Core Labour
Standards. Instead, the Worker Rights Minimum Condition is based partly on criteria that
correspond to 3 of the 4 ILO Core Labour Standards – it does not include the right against
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation – and partly on an “acceptable
conditions of work” criterion.132 In addition to the fact that it does not correspond to the ILO
Core Labour Standards, the “acceptable conditions of work” criterion is vague.133 The conditions
of work that the President might deem “acceptable” are not readily determinable from the
legislation governing the US GSP Scheme.134 Because the Worker Rights Minimum Condition is
not based solely on the ILO Core Labour Standards, it is likely that it is not sufficiently linked to
well-recognized concepts of development to meet the Predicted WTO Requirements. This is
because integral concepts of sustainable development only acknowledge the need for countries to
comply with the ILO Core Labour Standards.
It also appears that the Worker Rights Minimum Condition is discriminatory. It has
already been illustrated that it is based, in part, on a subjective criterion (i.e. the “acceptable
conditions of work” criterion). In addition, rather than requiring developing countries to
implement the internationally-recognized worker rights it sets out, the Worker Rights Minimum
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Condition merely requires them to have taken, or be taking, steps to accord such rights to its
workers.135 This second subjective criterion ensures that the President has wide discretion in
assessing whether a developing country has met the Worker Rights Minimum Condition.136 It is
thus possible (and perhaps even likely) that he could exercise his discretion in a discriminatory
manner. He could, for example, require different developing countries to take different steps to
accord internationally-recognized rights to their workers.137 It is also problematic that, in
assessing whether a developing country has met the Worker Rights Minimum Condition, the
President is not required to consider the findings of any international worker rights monitoring
body. This suggests that the President’s assessment might not be based upon any objective
findings.
The legislation governing the US GSP Scheme does contemplate that interested private
parties can petition the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) to review the worker
rights performance of a developing country that is looking to acquire beneficiary status under the
US GSP Scheme.138 Accordingly, one can assume that, when such a review is conducted, and the
results of the same are made available to the President, his assessment of whether a developing
country has met the Worker Rights Minimum Condition will have some sort of objective
basis. 139 Of course, when the office of the USTR conducts a review of the worker rights
performance of a developing country, it uses the same subjective criterion (i.e. whether a
developing country has taken, or is taking, steps to accord its workers international-recognized
worker rights) as the President does when he applies the Worker Rights Minimum Condition.140
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The office of the USTR thus enjoys the same wide discretion as the President. Accordingly, it is
possible that the Worker Rights Minimum Condition could be applied in a discriminatory
manner even if it is applied in accordance with the findings of a review conducted by the office
of the USTR.
Based on the above analysis, and assuming that a WTO adjudicating body would
determine its legality using the Predicted WTO Requirements, it appears that the Worker Rights
Minimum Condition would not be declared WTO-legal.
(ii)

WTO-Legality of the Worker Rights Component of the Discretionary
Ineligibility Criteria and the Withdrawal of Tariff Preferences on
Worker Rights Grounds

In light of the above analysis, it can be assumed that the worker rights component of the
Discretionary Ineligibility Criteria, which is virtually identical to the Worker Rights Minimum
Condition, would not be declared WTO-legal. It can also be assumed that it is not WTO-legal for
the US to withdraw tariff preferences from developing countries on the basis of: (i) the Worker
Rights Minimum Condition or (ii) the worker rights component of the Discretionary Ineligibility
Criteria.
VII/

CONCLUSION
Ironically, this paper has illustrated that, subject to certain conditions, developed WTO

members may impose conditions on the tariff preferences they accord to developing countries
under their GSP schemes. It has been concluded that, while the labour standards conditions in the
current EC GSP Scheme would likely withstand a WTO challenge, those in the current US GSP
Scheme would not. This conclusion can probably be extended to most, if not all, of the
conditions in the GSP schemes of the EC and the US given that: (i) the EC has made significant
efforts to bring its GSP scheme into compliance with the Appellate Body’s decision in EC –
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Tariff Preferences and (ii) the US GSP Scheme is based almost entirely on negative
conditionality and subjective criteria. Accordingly, it appears that the WTO-legality of the entire
US GSP Scheme has been called into question by the Appellate Body’s decision in EC – Tariff
Preferences. Notwithstanding this, it is unlikely that any significant reforms are in the US GSP
Scheme’s future. WTO dispute settlement is costly and, unlike India, most developing countries
lack the necessary resources to bring WTO challenges.141 In any event, it may not even be in the
best interests of developing countries to challenge the conditions the US imposes on the tariff
preferences it makes available to them under its GSP Scheme. This is because developed WTO
members are not obliged to have GSP schemes. As such, in the event that a WTO adjudicating
body threatens to limit the US’ discretion to accord tariff preferences to developing countries in
any manner it sees fit, the US could simply collapse its GSP scheme.142 So, while the US’
manner of imposing conditions ondeveloping countries’ tariff preferences is not compatible with
WTO law, it is likely a tactic the US will continue to employ.
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